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tion arose in Leuschner v. State, 41 Md.
App. 423, 397 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 285
Md. 731, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 933 (1979).
In that case, an undercover State Police officer had been placed in the defendant's
jail cell under false pretenses. Statements
made by the accused were held admissible
because they were not made in response to
interrogation. The Hamilton court distinguished its situation from that in Leuschner.
The court's decision in Hamilton is sure
to delight law enforcement personnel. The
use of "jail plants," which has long been a
favored investigatory tactic, now has the
court's official stamp of approval. This
tactic, though, is not without its share of
criticism. One court has stated that "[t]he
frustration of the prosecuting authorities
is understandable. There is, however, no
excuse for this questionable conduct, which
might result in reversal in a closer case."
Flittie v. Solem, 751 F.2d 967 (8th Cir.
1985). But see Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Messiah, and Miranda; What Is ''Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67
Geo. L. J. 1, 69 (1978).
- Edward B. Lattner

Bailey v. State: PRE-TRIAL
DISCLOSURE EXTENDED TO
NON-MARYLAND POLICE
OFFICER
In Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 496
A.2d 665 (1985) the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that oral statements which
the state intended to use at trial and which
had been made by the defendant to out-ofstate police were statements made by the
defendant to a state agent within the meaning of Md. Rule 4-263(b)(2) (formerly
Rule 741(b)(2».
The appellant, Bailey, was charged with
having committed a robbery with a deadly
weapon on September 29, 1983. Along
with other property alleged to have been
taken from the victim was a 1967 Ford
Mustang. Bailey and a companion were arrested later that day in possession of the
Mustang on the New Jersey Turnpike by
Officer Jenkins, of the New Jersey State
Police.
On February 16, 1984, the state said
that Bailey had made no oral or written
statements known to them at that time.
The defendant then formally requested,
pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(b), that the
state submit a copy of the substance of
each statement made by the defendant to a
"state agent" that the state intended to use
at trial. The state did not respond, leaving
intact its position that no statement had
been made. The state did, however, list
Officer Jenkins as a witness it intended to
call.
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At trial, during the opening statement,
the prosecution. made reference to and described the prearrest statement made by
the defendant to Officer Jenkins. The defense objected based on the state's failure
to disclose this statement prior to trial.
The trial court ruled there was no discovery violation because Officer Jenkins was
not a "state agent" within the meaning of
that phrase as used in Maryland Rule
4-263.
The court of appeals granted certiorari
to decide whether the statements made by
the defendant to non-Maryland police officers which the state intended to use at
trial, were discoverable under Md. Rule
4-263.
In support of the trial court's ruling, the
state made three arguments. First, the
state argued that Md. Rule 4-263 is not applicable to agents of another sovereign.
The court rejected this argument noting
that the inter-relationship between subsections (a) and (b) of the rule require a different interpretation than that posited by
the state in this case. Md. Rule 4-263(a)
requires certain disclosures to be made by
the state without the defendant's request.
Subsection (b) deals with those matters
discoverable on request by the accused, including those made to a "state agent." Md.
Rule 4-263(b )(2). However, under the 'old
rule', subsection (a) contained the following scope provision, conspicuously absent
from subsection (b): "the State's Attorney's

obligations under this section extend to material and information in the possession or
control of . . . any others who have participated in the investigation ... of the case
and who ... with reference to the particular case have reported to his office." Rule
741(a)(3) (emphasis added). If the state's
contention was correct, the state would be
forced to disclose the statement because
subsection (a) would not be limited to "state
agents." The defense however, would not
be able to acquire the substance of the
statement under subsection (b) because it
would be limited to "state agent." In addition, most motions to suppress are based
on federal constitutional violations in obtaining the evidence. These violations may
be made by either state or federal agents.
Clearly, the state's interpretation of Md.
Rule 4-263 creates anomalous results and
frustrates the very purpose of the rule.
The prosecution's second contention
was that the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1982), has applicability to the discovery
issue here on appeal. The Jencks Act currently requires production of statements
"in possession of the United States." The
state claimed that the statements here are
in possession of state officials, which would
not constitute "in the possession of the
United States," for purposes of the act.
According to the court, the Jencks Act
was inapplicable to the present situation
because the scope provisions of 4-263
clearly prove a contrary intent. The court,
Winter, J986/The Law Forum-23

~

against him, and forcing the defense to file
motions to suppress prior to trial. Second,
the ruling clearly lays out a three step analysis for the trial court to follow in evaluating possible discovery violations under the
rule.
- Lori S. Simpson

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.lmrex Company,
Inc.: THE SUPREME COURT GIVES
ITS APPROVAL TO THE USE OF
THE CIVIL RICO PROVISIONS

again, made reference to the scope provision of Rule 74 1(a)(3), noting that in reenactment the provision had been moved
from subsection (a)(3) to subsection (g) and
now reads "obligations of the State's Attorney under this Rule." Md. Rule 4-263(g)
(emphasis added). "This change merely
presents more clearly the intent of the
predecessor, Md. Rule 741(a) and does
not represent an enlargement of the obligations of a State's Attorney in furnishing
disclosure." 303 Md. at 651, 496 A.2d
at 668.
Finally, the state argued that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to admit Officer Jenkin's testimony
and in permitting prosecutor's reference to
it in his opening remarks. Alternatively,
the state claimed that if there was error, it
was not prejudicial. The court, once again,
rejected this contention, drawing an analogy between this case and Colter v. State,
297 Md. 423,466 A.2d 1286 (1983). Colter
involved the portion of the discovery rule
dealing with the identity of alibi witnesses
and rebuttal-to-alibi witnesses. The court
held that the practice of the judge excluding testimony from these nondisclosed
witnesses was an abuse of discretion. In
the instant case, however, the trial judge
ruled there was no discovery violation, the
question was never reached as to what
sanction, if any, should be applied. The
court went on to explain that there was a
discovery violation in this case and whether
24- The Law Forum/Winter, 1986

or not it was prejudicial, turns on two
things. The first is whether Bailey would
have moved to suppress upon obtaining
the statements; the second is whether that
motion to suppress would have been successful.
Based on the above reasoning, the court
remanded the case without affirmance or
reversal, mandating that the trial court
undertake a process potentially involving
three steps. First, the trial judge will realize that there was a discovery violation. He
shall consider the defendant's objection as
of the time it was made and then determine
the appropriate remedy. If exclusion is the
proper remedy, then a new trial will be
granted. If exclusion is not necessary, then
the judge proceeds to step two.
Next, a suppression hearing should be
held if the defendant moves to suppress on
other grounds. At that hearing, a determination of whether to exclude or not must
be made. Again, if exclusion is the appropriate remedy a new trial must be granted.
Step three involves the determination of
prejudice. If exclusion was not the appropriate remedy in the suppression hearing,
the state must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice or
the judge shall grant a new trial.
The court's holding in Bailey serves two
purposes. First, it furthers the rationale
behind Md. Rule 4-263; that of requiring
the state to disclose statements, therefore
apprising the defendant of the evidence

In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company,
Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985), the Supreme
Court examined the utilization of the privare civil action provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968 (1970). The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit and may serve to greatly expand
the use of the private civil action provisions ofRICO.
In 1979, Sedima, a Belgian corporation,
entered into a joint venture agreement
with Imrex to provide electronic components to another Belgian corporation.
Under the terms of the agreement, the
buyer was to order the parts through Sedima, and then Imrex was to obtain the
parts in this country and ship them to
Europe. The net proceeds were to be split
between Sedima and Imrex. However, Sedima became convinced that Imrex was
presenting inflated bills, thereby cheating
Sedima out of its fair share of the proceeds
by collecting for nonexistent expenses.
In 1982, Sedima filed suit in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of
New York against Imrex, setting forth
several common law claims. In addition,
Sedima filed claims under the civil action
provisions of RICO, pursuant to § 1964(c).
Two counts alleged violations of§ 1962(c),
based on the predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud. The third count alleged a conspiracy to violate § 1962(c).
The district court dismissed the RICO
counts for failure to state a claim. The
court held the requirement of § 1964(c)
that the jury be "by reason of a violation of
section 1962", means that it must be different in kind from the direct injury resulting from the predicate acts of racketeering
activity. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). The court further held the complaint must allege a "RICO-type injury",
which was some type of distinct racketeering or competitive injury. Id. at 965.
The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision

